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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  The notion of indirect appropriability as advanced and applied by Liebowitz (1981, 
1985) emphasizes that the ability to copy enhances the willingness to pay for originals since 
the demand for originals reflects copiers’ demand for an input in addition to consumers’ 
demand for an output (for which copies are a substitute).  This important insight has been 
widely developed in the theoretical literature and frequently used to provide insight into the 
circumstances under which copying may prove beneficial to the producer of originals, 
limiting the relevance of legislative copyright protection and possibly even harming 
copyright owners if such protection were enforced.  In his contribution to a recent   
symposium, however, Liebowitz (2005) considers that this literature has perhaps oversold the 
applicability of the concept, and bemoans the general lack of empirical studies necessary to 
give credence to the robustness of indirect appropriability.  Thus, although Liebowitz (1985) 
established positive effects of pirating on the profitability of producers of originals in the case 
of photocopying academic journals, he is clearly unconvinced of the generality of such a 
result in other contexts, particular in cases involving digital technologies such as file-
sharing.
1
While Liebowitz’s point is well taken, the present article makes little contribution to 
the empirical debate regarding indirect appropriability.  Instead, it generalizes the theoretical 
model of Watt (2000) in order to test for the robustness of indirect appropriability to the 
choice of the structure of royalty payments made by a producer of originals to a creator. The 
essential elements of Watt’s model are as follows. There exists a sole producer of an original 
1 For theoretical arguments suggesting the widespread importance of indirect appropriability in the context of 
competitive markets that could make copyright law largely otiose, see, in particular, Boldrin and Levine (2002, 
2004, 2005), and for more skeptical views, Klein, Lerner and Murphy (2002),  Liebowitz (2002, 2003, 2005), 
and Johnson and Waldman (2005).   3
delivery good (hereafter “producer”) possessing monopoly power in an initial period and 
facing the threat of entry by a sole pirate (which makes no royalty payments) in a subsequent 
period.  Originals and copies are assumed to be perfect substitutes, with a continuum of 
consumers each demanding one unit of the good and satisfying first period linear inverse 
demand p1 = 1 – bx, where 0  p1   1.
2  In the second period, consumers (whose time 
preference is zero) discount their willingness to pay by a positive fraction k, reflecting the 
reduced durability of a product for which consumption is delayed until period 2.  Period 2 
inverse demand is defined by p2 = k(1 – bx), where 0  p2  k, and if period 1 sales are 
positive, the relevant period 2 demand is residual demand. The pirate must purchase a unit of 
the delivery good in period 1  for use as a template for copying, and can only sell copies to 
consumers in period 2.  If the pirate enters, Cournot competition occurs in period 2, while if 
the pirate elects not to enter, the producer maintains the monopoly over both periods.  Other 
than the fixed cost of the pirate’s purchasing of a unit to serve as the copying template, all 
other fixed costs are assumed to be zero and both firms face the same constant marginal 
production cost c.  No copyright protection is assumed to be available.  Nevertheless, Watt 
establishes the possibility that indirect appropriability may be sufficiently important for the 
producer of originals to welcome so-called unauthorized copying by a pirate, and provides 
some simulation results illustrating this outcome. 
  In Watt’s analysis, the producer pays a royalty to a creator that is proportional to sales 
volume, the royalty rate  being independent of the period in which sales are made.  An 
2 The assumption that originals and copies are perfect substitutes is one of the few nudges in the direction of 
favouring the relevance of indirect appropriability in Watt’s model.  For example, Besen and Kirby (1989) show 
that imperfect of substitution along with unlimited copying potential does not permit indirect appropriation in 
their model since competition among purchasers of originals drives their price down to marginal cost.  Similar 
results are shown by Johnson and Waldman (2005) even when only limited copying is possible.  Lower quality 
copies constrain the prices of originals and low consumer valuation of imperfect copies can in turn prevent 
profitable indirect appropriation; see Takeyama (1997), Belleflame (2003), and Johnson and Waldman (2005).   4
important implication is that while the producer’s two-part marginal cost is c + , the pirate’s 
marginal cost is only c, since the pirate avoids royalty payments.  If the pirate enters in period 
2, the producer faces a cost disadvantage, and, whatever the size of the market in this period, 
the producer’s Cournot equilibrium output share is smaller than that of the pirate while the 
producer’s profit share in period 2 is smaller still.  In the present article, Watt’s model is 
generalized so that a time-invariant value of the royalty rate  is a special case.  More 
generally, we have 1  2, and compare these circumstances to Watt’s benchmarks where 1
= 2 = .
While Watt’s model emphasizes the importance of strategic first-period price-setting 
by the producer, decoupling the royalty rate across time adds an additional strategic 
dimension to the producer’s decisions.  For example, it permits consideration of the “level 
playing field” case where the producer and the pirate potentially compete with identical 
marginal costs in the second period, so that whatever is the size of this market, output and 
profit shares will be equal if the pirate enters. To make comparisons meaningful, however, 1
and 2 are set so as to generate the same royalty income as would a given time-invariant ,
thus leaving the creator indifferent to the producer’s choice of royalty structure.  An 
implication is that if royalties are paid only in period 1, the producer must face a 
correspondingly higher royalty rate in period 1 in order to compensate the creator for the loss 
of royalty income in period 2.  In turn, this raises marginal cost in period 1, reducing sales in 
this period and shifting some demand into period 2 where the producer can now compete on 
more favourable terms.  There is no guarantee, however, that a feasible iso-royalty income 
value of 1 exists in these circumstances, or, more generally, where 2  0. Where feasible 
iso-royalty income values of 1 and 2 exist, however, the interesting possibility arises that it 
may pay the producer to raise the period 1 royalty rate and lower the period 2 royalty rate  5
sufficiently for 2 to become negative, in which case the creator agrees to subsidize 
production in the second period in order for the producer to overturn the pirate’s usual cost 
advantage. 
Finally, the analysis permits testing of the robustness of Watt’s important result that 
for a range of parameter values, the producer may be able to design a period 1 pricing 
strategy that would exclude a pirate from entry, but such a strategy need not be optimal and 
that it is in the producer’s interest to accommodate entry by the pirate. In these 
circumstances, if the pirate were excluded as a result of the introduction of copyright law, the 
producer of originals would lose profits by the pirate’s enforced removal. Here, economic 
theory is seen by Watt as a foe rather than a friend of copyright law, although producers 
might elect not to enforce their rights against infringers depending on how damages are 
awarded by the courts.  And while the optimality of piracy accommodation may not be 
applicable for much of the relevant parameter space, the result is significant given the 
assumption that network externalities are absent, and the producer has neither the means of 
selling to groups of consumers nor of determining the identity of the pirate when first-period 
sales are made, ruling out the practice of price discrimination.
3
3 Besen and Kirby (1989) and Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999) demonstrate related, but different, 
conditions under which sharing in teams of consumers permits the possibility that copying can help profitability; 
see Johnson and Waldman (2005) for further discussion. In Liebowitz (1985), producer gains from indirect 
appropriability are significant because libraries, representing consumer groups, have higher willingness to pay 
than individual subscribers to journals and can be identified as such, so that a necessary condition for price 
discrimination is present.  Further, in his contribution to a recent symposium on indirect appropriability, Watt 
(2005) also emphasizes the importance of price discrimination in supporting the relevance of indirect 
appropriation.  Novos and Waldman (1984), however, emphasize the difficulties in identifying pirates, while 
Johnson (1985) assumes that indirect appropriability is impossible so that producers are always harmed by 
piracy.  In this context, Watt’s results are important in that indirect appropriability can be profitable even when 
price discrimination is impossible.        6
II.  A GENERALIZED MODEL OF COPYRIGHT PIRACY 
  Analytical development follows closely the procedure outlined in Watt (2000, 
Chapter 2.4). To set the stage, consider first single period behaviour of a monopoly producer 
facing inverse linear demand p =  - x and marginal cost 
.  At any price p sales will be 
x(p) = ( - p)/.           ( 1 )  
Profits are 
%(p) = [( - p)/](p - 
).         (2) 
The first order condition to maximize profits with respect to the choice of the price is  
%1(p) = [( - p)/] - [(1/)(p - 
)] = (1/)( - 2p + 
) = 0,        (3) 
whence 
p* = ( + 
) / 2 .            ( 4 )    
The second-order condition is satisfied since %2(p) = -2/ < 0. 
  Substitution from (4) into (2) yields the equilibrium value of profits as 
%(p*) = ( - 
)
2/4.           ( 5 )  
  Now consider the monopolist producer who supplies originals over two periods in the 
absence of threat of entry by the pirate.  If the monopolist sells a positive amount in period 1, 
consumers buying in period 1 will not participate in period 2 so the second-period residual 
inverse demand curve is 
p2 = k(1 - bx1 – bx) = k(p1 – bx).        (6) 
In Watt, the royalty rate is time-invariant, but here we distinguish the royalty rates 
1 and 2 by periods.Optimal second-period profits can then be expressed in terms of the 
period 1 price as follows. Substituting 
 = kp1  = kb   
 = c +  (distinguishing  by period)  7
into (5) yields: 
%2(p1) = (kp1 - c - 2)
2/4kb.          ( 7 )  
Total profits for the two periods are: 
%(p1) = %1+ %2 = [(1 - p1)/b](p1 - c - 1) + (kp1 - c - 2)
2/4kb.     (8) 
The first-order condition to maximize profits over both periods with respect to the choice of 
the period 1 price is 
%1(p1) = [2(1 + 1) - 2 + c - (4 - k)p1]/2b = 0, 
whence 
*
1 p = [2(1 + 1) - 2 + c)]/(4 - k).        (9) 
The second-order condition is satisfied since %2(p1) = -(4 - k)/2b < 0. 
To find the optimal price for period 2, substitute  = k
*
1 p = and 
 = c + 1 into (4), 
while optimal period 2 profits are obtained by substituting 
*
1 p from (9) for p1 in (7). 
  Now let there be a threat of entry by the pirate, who may purchase one unit of the 
original in period 1 and compete under Cournot quantity competition in period 2.  Again, 
consider the equilibrium under fairly general generic conditions, and consider the special 
cases seriatim. Begin with period 2 assuming that both producers are in the market.  The 
profits of producer i are  
i S (
i x ) = 
i x ( - 
i x  - 
j x  - 
i G ) .        ( 1 0 )  
For producer i, the first-order condition to maximize profits with respect to own-quantity, 





i x  = ( - 
j x  - 
i G ) - 2
i x  = 0, 
whence 
* i x = ( - 
j x  - 
i G ) /2.         ( 1 1 )   8
Similarly, the optimal strategy for producer j is 
* j x = ( - 
i x -
j G )/2.         ( 1 2 )    
The solution to the pair of simultaneous linear equations (11) and (12) is 
* i x  = ( +
j G  - 2
i G )/3.                        (13) 
* j x = ( + 
i G  - 2
j G )/3.         ( 1 4 )  
Total output in equilibrium is 
x* =  
* i x +
* j x = (2 -
j G  - 
i G )/3.        ( 1 5 )  
The equilibrium profits of producers i and j are, respectively, 
i S (
* i x ) = 
* i x ( - x*-
i G ) = (1/9)( + 
j G  - 2
i G )
2.     (16) 
j S (
* j x ) = 
* j x  ( - x*-
j G ) = (1/9)( + 
i G  - 2
j G )
2.     (17) 
  Since piracy (and Cournot competition) occurs only in the second period, the relevant 
substitutions (assuming i produces originals and j produces pirated copies) are
 = kp1;  = kb;
i G  = c + 2;
j G  = c.




x  = (kp1 - c - 22)/3kb,         ( 1 8 )  
*
2
p x = (kp1 - c + 2)/3kb.        ( 1 9 )  






x ) = (1/9kb)(kp1 - c - 22)





p x ) = (1/9kb)(kp1 - c +2)
2.        ( 2 1 )  
  The optimal first period pricing strategy of the producer of originals when facing a 
pirate in the second period can now be obtained.  In period 1, the producer of originals will 
sell to consumers according to their period 1 demand function, sell one unit to the pirate, and  9




1 p ) = [ (1 - l
1 p + b)/b] (l
1 p - c - 1),        (22) 
which, together with (20) gives total profits of 
m o S (l
1 p ) = [(1 - l
1 p + b)/b](l
1 p - c - 1) + (1/9kb)(kl
1 p - c - 22)
2.   (23) 
The first-order condition to maximize profits over both periods with respect to the choice of 
the period 1 price is 
m o S
c (l
1 p ) = (1/9b)[9 + 9b + 7c + 91 - 42 - (18 - 2k)l
1 p ] = 0.    (24) 
Solving (24) for l
1 p  yields the optimal first period pricing strategy for the producer of 
originals facing entry by a pirate in period 2. 
m *
1 p () = (9 + 9b + 7c + 91 - 42)/(18 - 2k).      (25) 
  Turning to the optimal strategy for the pirate, note that the pirate’s total profits must 
be non-negative to induce entry.  First-period profits are negative, equal to the negative of the 
price of the original that must be acquired in order to manufacture copies.  Second-period 
profits must therefore be positive, and at least as great as the first period price. Using p to 
denote a general first period price, the condition (using (21), and assuming that if profits are 
zero the pirate will not enter) is that 
p < (1/9kb)(kp - c +2)
2,         ( 2 6 )  
or that  
f(p)  k
2p
2 + k(22 - 2c - 9b)p + (2 - c)
2 > 0.         (27) 
The second derivative of (27) is 2k
2 > 0 so that f(p) is a convex function.  Denoting the 
expression (22 - 2c - 9b) by ] , the roots of (27) are given by   10








]] O r  
.        ( 2 8 )  
  Assuming the existence of a pair of real roots in (28), the implication is that the pirate 
will enter if the first period price is at least as great as r2 or is below r1.  A similar result is 
obtained by Watt, who reasons that if the first-period price is price is low, the original is 
inexpensive to acquire and consequently causes few inroads into a pirate’s first period profits.  
But since the original is inexpensive in period 1, many consumers will join the pirate in its 
purchase, reducing the demand for the pirate’s product when the pirate enters in period 2.  On 
the other hand, if the price is high, while the pirate’s first period profits will be negative and 
large in absolute magnitude, a high first period price for the original also chases away many 
consumers who will emerge when the pirate’s product is marketed in period 2.  The latter 
effect is clearly favourable to high period 2 profits for the pirate.  Where real roots of (27) do 
not exist, however,  f(p) > 0 for all p and the producer has no discretion over the choice of 
first-period price that might, but need not, exclude the pirate; the pirate always enters in these 
circumstances. 
  Turning now to the iso-royalty income constraint, where 1 = 2 = , and denoting the 







P PO    §·  ¨¸
©¹
.        ( 2 9 )  
Where 1  2, denoting the expression (9 + 9b + 7c + 91 - 42)/(18 – 2k) by ȣ, the 
producer’s corresponding royalty payments over the two periods are  11














.       (30) 
  The iso-royalty income constraint is satisfied by equating (29) and (30).  Denoting the 
expression 1/(18  - 2k) by ș and the expression (9 + 9b + 7c)ș by ȥ, after some manipulation 
the iso-royalty income constraint can be shown to satisfying the following condition: 
3k[(1 +  b)( - 1) – ȥ(
2
3












2)] – ( - 2)c – 
2(
2 - 2
2)  =  0.          (31) 
    
Clearly, (31) is an implicit function in , 1, and 2.  Taking  as given, and taking 2 (or, 
alternatively, 1) as given, (31) may be solved explicitly for the corresponding values of 1
(or, alternatively, 2) satisfying the iso-royalty income constraint.  For example, taking  and 
2 as given, the solution for 1is given by the roots of the following quadratic: 
g(1; , 2) = a(g)1
2 + b(g)1 + c(g) = 0,          (32) 















2)] – ( - 2)c – 2(
2 - 2
2).
  Real roots in (32) may not exist, in which case it is not possible to find values of 1
that satisfy the iso-royalty income constraint for the selected values of  and 2. 12
III.  SIMULATION METHODS AND RESULTS 
  In this section, a number of simulation results are presented and discussed. The 
methods by which these results were obtained is as follows.  The model was programmed in 
STATA 9, which was also used to carry out the simulation exercises.  The programme first 
sets benchmark values for the parameter set {c, k, b, } and given and 2, tests whether 
there exists any 1 satisfying the iso-royalty income constraint, i.e., checks the existence of 
real roots to (32).  Where a pair of distinct real roots exist, the root yielding the higher profits 
for the producer is subsequently chosen for further analysis once the following steps are 
carried out for each root. First, conditions for pirate entry are found by finding the roots of 
f(p) = 0 from (27), and, given the existence of real roots, the solutions for 
*
1 p and 
corresponding monopoly profits in each period are found.  The programme then examines the 
case of duopoly with pirate entry in period 2, and calculates the values of the endogenous 
variables of the system as functions of both roots.  Then, the root (r1 or r2) that maximizes 
profits under the monopoly regime is identified and denoted by r (with corresponding total 
profits ʌ(r)), along with the root that maximizes profits under the duopoly regime which is 
denoted by r   (with corresponding total profits  m l ()
o r S ).  The following four cases are then 
considered, with the following checks carried out. 
(1) If
*
11 2 rpr   and either 
**
11 21 ˆˆ  or  rp rp ! . If so, 
*(1) p  is given by the monopoly 
price, 
*
1 p , if 
**
11 ˆˆ () ()
o p p SS !  or by 
*
1 ˆ p if
**
11 ˆˆ () ()
o p p SS  .
(2) If
*
11 2 rpr   and 
*
11 2 ˆ rpr  . If so, 
*(2) p  is given by the monopoly price, 
*
1 p , if 
*
1 ˆˆ () ( )
o pr SS !  or by  ˆ r if
*
1 ˆˆ () ( )
o pr SS  .
(3) If either 
*
11 rp !  or if 
*
21 rp   and if either 
*
11 ˆ rp !  or if 
*
21 ˆ rp  . If so, 
*(3) p  is defined 
as r  if 
*
1 ˆˆ () ( )
o rp SS !  or by  
*
1 ˆ p if
*
1 ˆˆ () ( )
o rp SS  . 13
(4) If either 
*
11 rp !  or if 
*
21 rp   and if 
*
11 2 ˆ rpr  . If so, 
*(4) p  is given by r  if 
ˆˆ () ()
o rr SS ! or by  ˆ r if ˆˆ () ()
o rr SS  .
The programme then checks that non-uniform royalty rate pricing restrictions are satisfied,
4
and, if so, generates the maximum of the exclusion profit and the accommodation profit for 
the producer, and displays the optimal pricing and exclusion/accommodation strategies 
consistent with this profit maximum. 
In the simulation exercises, initial values of 2 are typically set equal to the value of 
chosen for the particular experiment, forcing equality between 1 and 2 and thus 
reproducing the results obtainable under Watt’s assumption of a royalty rate proportional to 
total sales over the two periods.  Holding constant and varying 2, and where the iso-
royalty income constraint is satisfied, the more profitable value of 1 is calculated. Newton-
Raphson search permits a mapping from feasible values of the royalty rates for each period 
into aggregate producer profits 
12 12 , ( ) ( , ) (, ) RR OO O O SOO   over the two periods.
5 In all experiments 
considered, a unique global maximum was identified. 
The first results to be discussed are shown in Table 1.  Regarding notation, 
*
m p
defines the optimal monopoly price that excludes the pirate, while m *
c p defines the optimal 
price that accommodates entry by the pirate.  Some combinations of 1 and 2 satisfying the 
                                                
4 These restrictions, which correspond to those of the case of a uniform royalty rate as derived by Watt (2000, p. 
51), are as follows.  For the case where the monopoly is maintained, 
*
1 p   0 < 2(1 + 1) - 2 + c   0; 
*
1 p   1 <
21 - 2 – 2 + k + c   0; 
*
2 p   0 <
*
1 p   0;  
*
2 p  k
*
1 p < 2 - 0.5k(1 + 1 + c) + c   0.  For the case where 
the pirate enters and Cournot competition occurs in period 2,  m *
1 p   0 < 1 – (4/9)2 + 1 + b + (7/9)c   0;  m *
1 p 
1 < 1 – 1 + (2/9)k + b + (7/9)c – (4/9)2   0;  m *
2 p   0 < m *
1 p  b(k m *
1 p - c - 22)/3kb; m *
2 p  k m *
1 p < k[2(1 + 
1) - 2 + c]/(4 – k)   0.
5 Discontinuities in this profit function occur if and when the optimal strategy switches between accommodation 
and exclusion.  14
 Table 1.  Simulation 1 [c = 0.1,  k = 0.5, b = 0.02] 












   - 0.0352 
r1 0.0185 0.0250 0.0323  0.0897  0.0902 
r2 0.5415 0.5750 0.6077  0.8090  0.8106 
*
1 p 0.6143 0.6174 0.6210  0.6556  0.6560 
m *
1 p 0.5959 0.5985 0.6015  0.6317  0.6320 
ʌ(
*
1 p ) 9.5714 9.6431 9.7069  9.8491  9.9123 
*







m p ) 9.3399 9.5641 9.6992  9.8491  9.9123 
m *
c p m *
1 p m *
1 p r2 r2 r2
m m * ()
o
c p S 9.5619 9.5994 9.6294  9.3064  8.1663 
optimal 
strategy  p* =  m *
1 p
accommodate













p2 0.1827 0.1798 0.2169  0.2086  0.1964 
l




2 S 0.1350 0.1990 0.2745  0.5000  0.6593 
m
1
o S / m m * ()
o
c p S 0.9889 0.9835 0.9761  0.9244  0.8079  15
iso-royalty income constraint for parameter values of  = 0.05, c = 0.1, k = 0.5, and b = 0.02 
are compared.  These parameter values correspond to Watt’s scenario 1 in his Table 2.1, p. 
52. Scenario 1 in Table 1 replicates Watt’s results, showing that with a uniform royalty rate 
of 5 percent along with the other specified parameter values, the optimal policy for the 
producer of originals is to set a first-period price at a level that induces entry by the pirate 
and, by implication, reject setting a lower first-period monopoly price for which the pirate 
would elect not to purchase the delivery good from the producer and so would not enter the 
market in period 2.  The relatively high price of the good encourages entry by leaving a 
sufficient level of residual demand to make entry profitable for the pirate.
6 Accommodation 
of the pirate is more profitable than exclusion at the relatively low monopoly price because 
the small size of the second-period market (particularly when shared with the producer) 
makes entry unprofitable even though the cost of purchasing the delivery good is smaller 
under feasible monopoly pricing. This significant result illustrates indirect appropriability in 
action even when it is impossible to determine the pirate’s identity a priori.
In addition to replicating Watt’s solution values for prices and profits for this 
simulation, Table 1 further explores the characteristics of this particular accommodation 
equilibrium by investigating equilibrium profit shares in the final three rows.  The first of 
these,  l
2 S / l S , shows the share of period 2 industry profits in industry profits over both 
periods as a small 7.70 percent.  The second,  m
2
o S /l
2 S , shows the producer’s share of period 2 
industry profits as a relatively small 13.50 percent, reflecting the producer’s marginal cost 
disadvantage (c  +  = 0.15 versus c = 0.10 for the pirate) when the producer and the pirate
                                                
6 Note that in both Watt’s simulation results and in the present article, optimal second-period prices lie below 
first-period prices, consistent with many optimal price trajectories found in the more general framework of 
Nascimento and Vanhonacker (1988).     16
compete in period 2.  This illustrates the well-known result that even small differences in 
marginal cost lead to relatively large differences in output and profits among Cournot 
competitors.  The final row,  m
1
o S / m m * ()
o
c p S , shows that the share of the producer’s first-period 
profits in its profits over both periods is nearly 99 percent.  Evidently, this accommodation 
equilibrium involves setting a sufficiently high price in period 1 that leaves a sufficiently 
large market in period 2 to induce entry by the pirate, which receives the vast majority of 
profits earned in period 2.  Nevertheless, the pirate’s profits are only 6.67 percent of industry  
profits over the two periods, so that the producer of originals captures the vast bulk of its total 
gains in period 1. And by charging the (lower) best monopoly price and excluding the pirate, 
the producer would face a miniscule second-period market under this parameter set. 
A question arises, however, as to the robustness of this result when the producer may 
be able to take strategic advantage of a more flexible royalty structure than is assumed by 
Watt. Scenario 1.1 in Table 1 illustrates the outcome when there is a 0.0005 (1 percent) 
increase in the royalty rate applying to period 1 sales along with a compensating reduction of 
0.01 (20 percent) in the royalty rate applying to period 2 sales in order to maintain constant 
the creator’s royalty income.  This minor change in the royalty structure leaves unchanged 
the decision to accommodate the pirate, and involves a small increase in the optimal period 1 
price, expanding the market in period 2.  Ceteris paribus, this is desirable for the producer 
since its marginal cost falls in period 2 and it increases its shares of output and profits in this 
period.  The producer’s share of period 2 profits increases from 13.50 percent to 19.90 
percent, although the reduction in the optimal second-period price helps to explain the very 
small increase in the share of period 2 industry profits in total profits for both firms over the 
two periods.  The change in royalty structure, however, is profitable for the producer, whose 
profits over both periods increase by 3.75 percent.  17
Scenario 1.2 in Table 1 considers a further reduction in the period 2 royalty rate (to 3 
percent) along with a compensating increase in 1 to 5.17 percent.  Again, this relatively 
minor further change is profitable for the producer. For example, the producer would gain 
additional profits of 0.07 (0.7 percent) over the outcome in scenario 1.1 if the pirate continues 
to be accommodated. The producer, however, does better still by setting an optimal 
monopoly price in period 2 and excluding the pirate.
7 The optimal monopoly price 
*
m p is 
equal to the root r2 = 0.6077, and which exceeds the corresponding optimal accommodation 
price  m *
1 p = 0.6015 in this instance, illustrating the point that the optimal monopoly first-period 
price may, but need not, be less than the corresponding optimal accommodation price.   
Scenario 1.3 in Table 1 illustrates the special case whereby the producer of originals 
designs a royalty structure such that if the pirate entered, the two firms would compete on a 
level playing field regarding production costs in period 2, and would accordingly share the 
period 2 market equally.  Here, 2 = 0 and 1 increases to slightly more than 6 percent in 
order to maintain royalty income constant.  In this case, compared to a uniform 5 percent 
royalty rate, the change in royalty structure is an inferior policy if the producer continues to 
accommodate the pirate, but the producer does better than in any of the aforementioned 
scenarios by excluding the pirate, retaining its monopoly, and charging a first-period price 
*
m p  = 
*
1 p  = 0.6556.  Its profits of 9.8491 are some 3 percent higher than in the scenario 1 
accommodation equilibrium. 
The final scenario 1* shown in Table 1, however, describes the optimal royalty 
structure relative to a uniform royalty rate  = 0.05.  Here, 1 increases to 8 percent in order
                                                
7 The unique switch point from an accommodation to an exclusion equilibrium occurs at 1 = 0.0508 and 2 = 
0.0374.   18
  to maintain royalty income constant, while 2 falls to – 3.47 percent, implying that the 
producer’s second-period marginal cost is 0.0653 compared to the pirate’s 0.1.  Again, the 
optimal policy is to maintain the monopoly and exclude the pirate, and the producer would do 
considerably worse relative to the benchmark of scenario 1 if it instead adopted its best 




1 p  = 0.6560, and its profits 
increase by 3.50 percent over the benchmark.  Notably, its optimal monopoly first-period 
price is much smaller than when it elects to compete under equal terms with a pirate (given 
entry), so that the second-period market is much smaller as a result.  But since its production 
costs in period 2 are subsidized by the creator, and given that the pirate is excluded, this small 
market is highly profitable. It is little wonder that the pirate stays out even though the 
delivery good is not priced too much higher than in the accommodation equilibrium; the 
second-period market is small and the pirate faces a significant cost disadvantage.  On the 
other hand, the producer would be most unwise to adopt this royalty structure and set its first-
period price at the optimal level that accommodates the pirate.  The producer’s profits over 
both periods would be nearly 15 percent less than if it maintained a time-invariant royalty 
rate of 5 percent in these circumstances. 
For the parameter set under consideration, these simulations suggest that increasing 
the royalty rate in period 1 and reducing the royalty rate in period 2 initially raises profits 
while maintaining accommodation of the pirate as an optimal policy.  The results also 
suggest, however, that the producer of originals does even better by making further similar 
directional changes in the royalty rates to the point where the second-period royalty rate is 
negative so that the creator actually subsidizes the second-period production of the producer 
and for which exclusion of the pirate is optimal.  19
Two final points regarding this benchmark simulation may also be noted. First, it is 
possible to obtain iso-royalty income equilibria in which royalty rates in both periods exceed 
the benchmark uniform rate of 5 percent and where it is optimal to continue to accommodate 
the pirate. An example is 1 = 0.05738 and 2 = 0.10. The producer’s profits with these 
royalty structures, however, are smaller than with the uniform royalty rate of 5 percent and 
consequently will never be adopted.  It was always more profitable for the producer to reduce 
2 in response to an increase in 1, given royalty income is held constant, and the producer’s 
profits decrease monotonically for increases in 1 in excess of 0.08.   Secondly, for values of 
1 less than 0.05 (other than arbitrarily close to 0.05), no values of 2 exist that satisfy the 
iso-royalty income constraint. 
  To consider the robustness of the general results emerging from the analysis of Watt’s 
scenario 1, first consider the results from the analysis of Watt’s three remaining scenarios as 
illustrated in Table 2.  Here, scenarios 2, 3, and 4 replicate Watt’s results for the parameter 
sets chosen, while scenarios 2*, 3*, and 4* describe the corresponding optimal royalty 
structures when royalty rates differ over time. 
Table 2 shows first that a ceteris paribus increase in the demand parameter b from 
0.02 to 0.025 leaves the general nature of the results from the first simulation unchanged.
8
The piracy accommodation result in Watt’s scenario 2 is again overturned in scenario 2*, and 
the most profitable strategy again involves an increase in the first-period royalty rate 
accompanied by a negative royalty rate in period 2.  With 1 and 2 set at their optimal values  
                                                
8 With b = 0.025 rather than 0.02, the benchmark profit shares are also much the same, with second-period 
duopoly profits increasing to a little over 9 percent of industry profits over the two periods, and the producer’s 
share of the duopoly profits increasing to 16.12 percent.  In the first period when the monopoly is held, the 
producer also continues to capture over 90 percent of total industry profits over the two periods.  20
Table 2.  Simulations 2-4 [c = 0.1, k = 0.5] 
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of 0.0807 and - 0.0356, respectively, the producer’s profits are 13.52 percent greater than 
with a uniform royalty rate  = 0.05, and are a substantial 60.71 percent greater than if the 
producer had instead chosen to accommodate the pirate by setting a first-period price  m *
c p  =r 2
= 0.9117.  The intuition is that in the latter case, even though a high return is obtained when a 
unit of the delivery good is sold to the pirate, there is a significant opportunity cost in that  21
sales to most consumers are thereby delayed.  The resulting second period market is very 
substantial and in spite of the considerable advantage gained by sharing it with a pirate over 
which the producer has a significant cost advantage, the combination of having to share this 
market along with the 50 percent discount applied to the valuation of the less-durable product 
by the bulk of consumers makes such a situation relatively unprofitable.  Thus, the producer 
retains the monopoly and excludes the pirate, adopting a first-period price 
*
1 p = 0.6563 that is 
only about 72 percent of the best accommodation price.  
Watt’s scenario 3 involves a ceteris paribus increase in b from 0.02 to 0.03, in which 
case the producer’s optimal strategy with a uniform royalty rate  = 0.05 is to exclude rather 
than accommodate the pirate.  An interesting question is, given that the accommodation 
results are overturned by the introduction of optimally-selected time-dependent royalty rates, 
whether the producer’s optimal strategy of excluding the pirate might be overturned when 
variable royalty rates are considered.  Scenario 3*, however, shows that while it again pays 
the producer to switch from a uniform royalty structure to one for which the first-period 
royalty rate is increased and the second-period royalty rate becomes negative, the policy of  
excluding the pirate and charging a first-period monopoly-maintaining price of 
*
1 p is 
unchanged, although the level of this price is greater in order to take advantage of a larger 
second-period market under the more favourable cost conditions.  In this case, when the 
royalty rates are adjusted to 1 = 0.0811 and 2 = - 0.0361, it is infeasible to optimally 
accommodate the pirate since  m *
c p = r2 = 1.0111, exceeding the value for which first-period 
demand becomes negative. 
Finally, Watt’s scenario 4 substantially reduces the uniform royalty rate from 0.05 to 
0.01, and sets the demand parameter b at 0.016, the smallest value chosen for his simulations.   22
As with scenario 3, it is both feasible and profitable to exclude the pirate.
9 Scenario 4*, 
however, shows that the producer again does better by increasing the first-period royalty rate 
(from 0.01 to 0.0364) and selecting a negative royalty rate (of - 0.0469 rather than 0.01) in 
period 2.  In this case, the optimal strategy now involves setting a first-period price equal to 
*
1 p rather than r2.
  In sum, in the scenarios examined by Watt where the producer of originals was able to 
set a monopoly price and exclude entry by a pirate but where it was not always profitable to 
do so, the accommodation equilibria are rejected in favour of exclusion when optimal time-
variant royalty rates are selected. On the other hand, in the scenarios where exclusion was 
both possible and profitable, setting optimal time-variant royalty rates did not upset the 
exclusion property (although different equilibrium values for the endogenous variables were 
obtained).  Further, optimal time-variant royalty rates are uniformly characterized by an 
increase in the royalty rate applying to the period for which there is no threat of piracy along 
with a reduction (to negative levels) of the royalty rate applying in period 2 whether or not 
the pirate is accommodated or excluded. Thus, the producer, instead of facing a cost 
disadvantage vis a vis a pirate entering in period 2, strategically chooses a royalty structure 
that leaves the  indifferent to a uniform royalty rate and provides a cost advantage over a 
pirate that is a potential entrant in the second period.  This cost advantage is sufficient in the 
cases examined to deter entry while raising the producer’s profits.  Notably, in all of Watt’s 
examples, optimal nonlinear royalty contracts produced exclusion prices that did not require 
limit pricing, a result characteristic of only one of the four examples when uniform royalty 
                                                
9 Notably, for parameter sets for which exclusion of the pirate is both feasible and optimal under uniform royalty 
rates, no cases were found for which it pays the producer to switch to accommodate entry by the pirate when 1
and 2 are both optimally chosen.  23
rates were assumed. 
  It is not possible to consider the full generality of these results, but an attempt was 
made to at least try to upset them.
10  First, a search was carried out to discover whether there 
existed cases where an existing optimal accommodation policy with a given uniform royalty 
rate survived the introduction of optimally-set time-variant royalty rates.  Such cases were 
found, but only after intensive and wide-ranging search.  One such case is generated by the 
following parameter set: c = 0.1; k = 0.65; b = 0.01.  With a uniform royalty rate  = 0.05, it 
pays the producer of originals to charge the best accommodating period 1 price and share the 
second-period market with the pirate, generating profits of 19.0672 for the producer over the 
two periods.  In this example, the share of period 2 producer profits in aggregate profits over 
firms and time is higher at 12.39 percent than in previous cases of accommodation 
equilibrium reported, while the producer’s profits in period 1 are a lower 87.62 percent.  As 
with simulations 1 and 2, however, the producer does better to increase the royalty rate in 
period 1 and reduce it in period 2, and does best to set 1 = 0.0726 and 2 = - 0.0137, 
continuing to accommodate the pirate and making profits of 19.321, a 1.33 percent increase 
over the uniform royalty rate benchmark. Profits decrease monotonically for increases in 1
accompanied by constant royalty income reductions in 2 thereafter, although profits continue 
to exceed those in the benchmark until 1 increases to somewhat more than 10 percent. When 
1 reaches 0.1675 and 2 is simultaneously reduced to – 0.0954, the system switches to an 
exclusion equilibrium initially, although feasible piracy accommodation equilibria re-emerge 
and are maintained when 1 is raised to about 20 percent or higher, until feasible solutions 
cannot be found for 1 in excess of approximately 50 percent (and which require an absolute 
                                                
10 Parameter sets investigated included the following: k {0.0, 1.0}; b {0.0, 0.05}; c {0.01, 0.10}; 
{0.0, 0.08}.         24
magnitude for 2 that would imply negative marginal costs for the producer in period 2 once 
1 exceeds about 40 percent).  Although these reswitching outcomes are interesting, none will 
be chosen if the accommodating royalty rates are chosen optimally.  Consequently, there 
exist situations in which accommodating the pirate continues to be the best policy, but the 
simulation evidence suggests that they are the exception rather than the rule. 
  Further, circumstances were considered whereby exclusion of the pirate under a given 
uniform royalty rate was not feasible; i.e., no real roots to f(p) in (27) exist with 1 = 2.  The 
question then arises, if 1  2 and the constant royalty income constraint is satisfied, can 
exclusion/accommodation equilibria emerge?  The answer is in the affirmative.  For example, 
consider the parameter set c = 0.01; k = 0.5; b = 0.01.  When 1 = 2 = 0.05, exclusion of the 
pirate is not possible no matter what price is set in period 1 by the producer of originals.  In 
these general circumstances, the producer then sets its best monopoly price for period 1 
independently of any strategic considerations involving period 2, and then either competes 
(on a cost-disadvantageous basis) as a Cournot duopolist in period 2, or exits the market, 
leaving the second-period market to the pirate.  When 1 and 2 are set optimally, however, 
an optimal accommodation equilibrium exists with 1 = 0.075 and 2 = - 0.0174.  The 
producer’s profits are 4.38 percent greater than when 1 = 2 = 0.05 and where the pirate 
could not be excluded whatever price was set in period 1.  With 1 and 2 set optimally as 
above, the producer now has the capacity to set a first-period price to exclude the pirate but 
does better to follow an accommodation policy.  At the optimal accommodation values of 1
and 2, the best exclusion strategy generates profits that are 35.88 percent lower than when 
the pirate is accommodated, and 33.07 percent lower than when a uniform royalty rate of 5  25
percent is adopted.
11  Note that in each royalty scenario described, the general outcome is 
observationally equivalent in the sense that the pirate enters the market in period 2, but only 
for the case where royalty rates are time-dependent is the pirate’s entry welcomed.  For this 
parameter set, if the uniform royalty structure were adopted, the producer of originals would 
happily support the introduction of copyright law. If 1 and 2 are set optimally, however, 
and enforceable copyright law exists, the producer would not bring suit against an infringing 
pirate if the pirate could mount an affirmative defence on the basis that the producer has 
suffered negative harm by the joint purchase of the delivery good and its subsequent use as a 
template for illicit copying. 
Finally, although the search over the feasible parameter space was reasonably 
exhaustive, it cannot by its nature be comprehensive given continuity of the parameters.   
What seems to be the case is that the microsimulation evidence evaluated in this 
article is strongly suggestive of a weakening, if not removal, of the capacity for indirect 
appropriability to sustain piracy “.... as an activity that should be embraced by the party being 
pirated, if they are farsighted and enlightened enough” [Liebowitz (2005, p. 5)], at least in the 
context of  Watt’s model of copyright piracy when royalty rates can be targeted to sales in 
different periods. 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article examines the robustness of results obtained by Watt (2000) showing that a 
producer of an original delivery good in an initial period may find it profitable to 
accommodate the subsequent entry of a pirate and engage in Cournot competition rather than 
                                                
11 As a policy, accommodation is both feasible and more profitable than exclusion of the pirate for a range of 
values of 1 somewhat less that 7.5 percent and somewhat greater than 15 percent (with corresponding 
compensating decreases in 2 in each case, and with 2 < 0). Further, these accommodation equilibria all 
generated higher profits for the producer than when 1 = 2 = 0.05 and the exclusion or accommodation of the 
pirate was not a feasible choice.     26
exercise a feasible exclusionary pricing strategy.  Although the theoretical literature contains 
a number of similar results, Watt makes life relatively tough sledding for himself in that 
many of the familiar means that utilize the concept of indirect appropriability for generating 
such results, including team consumption, price discrimination and network externalities, are 
assumed away.  Nevertheless, Watt produces a number of simulation results for which 
accommodating the pirate pays, although whether it does so depends critically on the value of 
chosen parameters. 
In his basic framework, Watt assumes that a simple linear royalty contract applies, 
with the producer of originals paying an amount to the creator that is a fixed proportion  of  
total sales made over time.  Further, in this framework,  is treated as exogenous.
12 The 
present article generalizes this model by admitting nonlinear royalty contracts characterized 
by royalty rates that are proportional to sales, but where the factor of proportionality can 
differ between periods.  Thus, whatever is the value of , it is assumed that the producer of 
originals either accepts the linear contract or is able to replace it with a feasible nonlinear 
contract that leaves total royalty payments to the creator unchanged.   
A critical strategic variable in this type of model is the choice of the first-period price 
of originals.  It is shown that this price is dependent on the choice of royalty rates in each 
period, and that the producer can strategically select such rates, along with first-period prices, 
such that total profits are raised.  In the examples used by Watt to illustrate the optimality of 
accommodating a pirate, the accommodation results are overturned; the producer does better 
to choose a feasible first-period price that excludes the pirate. This result, however, does not 
hold over all parameter sets examined. Nevertheless, it appears that the set of optimal 
                                                
12 In Watt (2000, Chapter 3), the creator’s choice of an optimal linear royalty contract with deterministic 
demand is addressed, but general analytical results for this complex problem are not obtained, although some 
numerical illustrations are provided.  27
accommodating equilibria is smaller when nonlinear royalty contracts are implemented. 
Conversely, in the examples used by Watt to illustrate the optimality of exclusion, optimal 
differentiation of royalty rates over time did not upset the general nature of these results in 
these or any other examples examined. Further, it is also shown that the additional degrees of 
freedom offered by nonlinear royalty contracts can transform a situation where the producer 
cannot feasibly exclude a pirate into a situation where exclusion becomes possible and yet the 
producer may still prefer to accommodate entry of its free-loading rival.  Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that when accommodation is an optimal policy, the producer sets a first-
period price at a level that generates a relatively small second-period market, and the 
producer captures by far the most of their intertemporal profits in the period for which entry 
is not threatened.  
The most important general result obtained from the simulation exercises, however, 
concerns the structure of optimal nonlinear royalty contracts in the sense used in this paper.  
In every simulation exercise considered where the producer possesses the discretion as to 
whether or not to accommodate entry by the pirate, and whether the optimal policy is to 
accommodate or exclude, the optimal policy is to increase the royalty rate in period 1 and 
reduce the corresponding royalty rate in period 2 sufficiently that it becomes negative, i.e., 
the creator subsidizes the producer’s output in the second period.   While many creators may 
look askance at such a proposal, the rationale is that the effect is to more than offset the 
producer’s marginal cost disadvantage against the pirate in period 2, thus giving the producer  
larger shares of output and profits should the pirate enter and which may, but need not, deter  28
entry of the pirate.  No theorem is claimed here, but the results appear to be quite robust.
13
Further work along these lines might account for the following issues.  First, the 
impacts of optimal nonlinear royalties on social welfare deserves investigation, particularly in 
respect of cases where accommodation of the pirate is replaced with (privately) optimal 
exclusion.  Second, the apparently general result that (privately) optimal nonlinear royalty 
policy requires using a first-mover advantage to gain a cost advantage over a potential entrant 
might be usefully be compared with (or analysed in conjunction with) some similar standard 
industrial organization analyses such as the role of investment in capacity as a potential entry 
deterrent to subsequent Cournot competition as in Dixit (1980).  Third, the analysis maintains 
Watt’s assumption of potential Cournot duopoly competition only.
14  As Watt (2000, p. 68, 
fn. 54) notes, additional potential pirates increase the demand for originals to serve as copies 
but also reduce the producer’s ability to compete in the second period.  The analysis of the 
use of nonlinear royalties so as to gain a cost advantage over multiple pirates that could enter 
in the face of positive second-period industry profits would also be enlightening. 
                                                
13 Robustness would be threatened if the creator simply takes the money in period 1 and runs, and either cannot 
later be found or turns out to be judgment–proof.  A contract assigning an appropriate part of period 1 royalty 
payments to a disinterested third party given strong incentives to ensure the distribution of these proceeds as 
period 2 subsidies, however, should deter such opportunism.   
14 In an analysis of software piracy using a strategic entry-deterrence framework, Banerjee (2006, p. 84, fn. 5) 
also assumes a duopoly market structure on the grounds that evidence suggests that “there are usually only one 
or two organizations that produces bootlegged copies of licensed software and sell it through different retail 
channels”. The number of firms in equilibrium, however, will presumably be a function of the strength and 
enforceability of copyright law which is not presumed to exist in either Watt (2000) or the present paper.  29
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